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Introduction
Lia Kent, Srinjoy Bose, Joanne Wallis, 
Sinclair Dinnen and Miranda Forsyth
Hybridity as a conceptual tool has long been discussed in a range of 
disciplines including the biological sciences, social sciences and even 
literature and literary criticism. In its literal sense, and as used in biology, 
the term ‘hybrid’ refers to the product of a process of mixing or combining 
two or more distinct elements. The concept originated in the biological and 
zoological sciences, where it was appropriated into the highly controversial 
pseudoscientific theories of race that informed debates about European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. In the social sciences, hybridity 
later became prominent in discussions of identity,1 culture,2 economic 
and power relations, and political systems,3 and has been characterised as 
the outcome of encounters between hegemonic practices and attempts to 
decolonise peoples, territories and knowledge. In the field of postcolonial 
studies, for example, hybridity was first articulated to help understand 
complex processes of sociopolitical interaction and relationships4 between 
colonial powers and colonised subjects. Critical of the coloniser’s or 
intervener’s aims to reform the ‘Other’ (that is, attempts to mould the 
colonised in the image of the coloniser or intervener), Bhabha stressed 
themes such as resistance to domination and the agential power of the 
colonised or subaltern subjects.5 Similarly, Kapoor argued that hybridity 
recognises the strategies of those who resist overt and subtle forms of 
1  Barry, Beginning Theory; Young, Colonial Desire.
2  Ashcroft et al., The Empire Writes Back; Ashcroft et al., Post-colonial Studies; Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken 
for Wonders’; Bhabha, The Location of Culture; Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’.
3  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States.
4  Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’.
5  Ibid.; Bhabha, The Location of Culture.
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colonisation.6 This framework was subsequently developed and applied 
to international relations and development literatures, specifically studies 
in conflict resolution, intervention and peacebuilding.7
In conflict resolution, hybridity implies a combination of elements from 
different—seemingly incompatible and inharmonious—world views. 
A hybrid order comprises a mixed structure of informal and formal 
institutions of power. Hybridity is ‘a state of affairs in which liberal and 
illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist’.8 Viewed in this way, the 
‘state’ is only one institutional actor and source of power among others 
within a ‘hybrid political order’, and ‘state order’ is only one of a number 
of competing orders claiming to provide security, frameworks for conflict 
regulation and other forms of welfare provision.9 Today, as Millar has 
noted, conflict resolution (and the associated concepts of peacebuilding, 
development, transnational justice and so on) lies at the heart of most 
debates on intervention, with many scholars problematising the roles 
of external interveners and local agential power.10 More specifically, the 
term hybridity has been used in critiques of the spate of ‘liberal’ peace 
interventions that occurred during the second half of the 1990s and the 
first decade of the new millennium. Focusing on the externally driven, 
state-centric, technical and formulaic orientation of these interventions 
and their neglect of local contexts, some recent critiques have adopted the 
notion of ‘hybrid peace’ to denote the interactive and contested quality of 
the processes involved in such encounters.11 This usage seeks to capture the 
‘intertwined relationship between the global and the local, the formal and 
the informal and the liberal and the illiberal’12 that characterises the actual 
practice of contemporary peacebuilding, as opposed to the assumptions 
of its underpinning (liberal peace) theory. It is argued that the outcome of 
these interactions—the ‘hybrid peace’—is both a more accurate depiction 
of the complex realities on the ground, and more legitimate than the 
6  Kapoor, ‘Acting in a Tight Spot’, 568.
7  See Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: 
How Does Hybrid Peace Come About?’; Richmond, ‘De-romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the 
International’.
8  Belloni, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance’, 22.
9  Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States; Clements et al., ‘State Building 
Reconsidered’; Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership; Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace.
10  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
11  Mac Ginty, ‘Gilding the Lily?’; Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down 
and Bottom-Up Peace’.
12  Björkdahl and Höglund, ‘Precarious Peacebuilding’, 293.
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liberal peace because it taps into local agency and knowledge, thereby 
broadening the peace constituency and more effectively capturing the 
dynamic and interactive processes involved.13
The term hybridity has also gained significance in policy discourse and 
practice set against the backdrop of growing international interventionism 
in recent decades.14 A notable example is the World Development Report 
2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, in which the World Bank 
acknowledged that in those parts of the global South in which state 
institutions are weak and much of the population lives according to local 
sociopolitical beliefs and practices, it might be necessary for international 
actors to move away from unilinear processes of institutional transfer from 
the global North and instead adopt flexible ‘best fit’ approaches that draw 
upon ‘combinations of state, private sector, faith based, traditional, and 
community structures for service delivery’.15 These developments suggest 
there has been a shift away from seeing local sociopolitical practices and 
institutions primarily as hurdles or spoilers to achieving a universal model 
of liberal democracy, towards a greater recognition of their potential 
strengths in advancing larger goals of peacebuilding and development.
The growing prominence of the hybridity concept in the conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding literatures, and in policy discourse and 
practice, helps to explain the current emphasis on interactions between 
the ‘international’ and the ‘local’. The hybrid approach was introduced to 
unsettle the statist,16 Eurocentric and linear logic of liberal peacebuilding, 
and locates peace both in the agency of the local, and in the hybrid 
formations of liberal and non-liberal institutions and values resulting 
from such encounters.17 Hybridity denotes ‘how local actors attempt 
13  Ibid.
14  Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and Practice’; Paris, At War’s End.
15  World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 106.
16  According to Nadarajah and Rampton, the hybrid approach characterises international 
peacebuilding as coercive, top-down, technocratic and blind to the conditions of the local 
environment. Thus, liberal peacebuilding is held to favour the interests of statists (those who 
favour the interests of local elites and international interveners) rather than the majority who suffer 
the weight of both conflict and peace engagements. The latter are systematically alienated from 
statebuilding and  peacebuilding processes. This renders the liberal peace illegitimate and drives 
various resistances that make impossible its advance and sustainability. Nadarajah and Rampton, 
‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 54.
17  Ibid., 49–50.
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to respond to, resist and ultimately reshape peace initiatives through 
interactions with international actors and institutions’.18 Nadarajah and 
Rampton argue that hybridity allows the ‘liberal peace’ to be:
transcended and its narrow ethnocentric boundaries, technocratic 
tendencies and fixation with state and institution-building overcome 
to produce a more empathetic, responsive, culturally sensitive and 
ultimately radical peace encompassing the local, indigenous and quotidian 
experience, especially that of the subaltern categories, within conflict-
affected spaces and societies.19
As noted above, hybrid processes arise from resistance to hegemony. 
The resistance may manifest itself in outright violence, active reform of 
introduced practices, co-optation and so on. Some within the policy and 
academic communities have tended to perceive obstacles to peace as lying 
primarily in deficiencies in local and state institutions in contemporary 
contexts of interventions.20 But does this view not smack of older and 
discredited colonial epistemologies? Richmond reminds us that grassroots-
level actors often have a more nuanced understanding of the limitations 
and potential of both their own frameworks and those promulgated by 
international authorities.21 He argues that blaming local actors for their 
own ills and conditionality is common among interveners, and that 
this imbues these interventions with a neocolonial character.22 Others, 
drawing on Spivak’s work,23 have argued that the colonised/intervened 
are active agents in creating, maintaining and modifying the colonial 
and postcolonial sociopolitical orders. They argue that local actors can be 
equipped to play an active role in statebuilding and peacebuilding processes 
and discourse. Quoting Duffield24 and Richmond,25 Wallis remarks that 
‘critiques converge on the emerging consensus that statebuilders should 
seek to engage in “unscripted conversations”26 with ordinary people, 
about the design of their state’.27 Writing in a postcolonial studies 
tradition, Bhabha is somewhat more critical, arguing that material power 
18  Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Introduction—Towards a Post-liberal Peace’, 8.
19  Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 53.
20  See, for example, Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’.
21  Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’.
22  Ibid., 51.
23  See Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’.
24  Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.
25  Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism’; Richmond, ‘A Post-liberal Peace: 
Eirenism and the Everyday’.
26  Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 234.
27  Wallis, ‘A Liberal–Local Hybrid Peace Project in Action?’, 736.
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imbalances between the (typically Western) hegemon and (typically non-
Western) subaltern ensures that the latter are structurally incapable of 
modifying existing power dynamics and relations.28
Alongside the growing prominence of hybridity as a concept is an emerging 
critique of hybridity.29 One aspect of the latter is its focus on the paradoxical 
ways in which the concept of hybridity can often serve to reinscribe the 
problematic binaries it seeks to overcome. Discussions of hybridity have 
often focused on the relationship between the ‘international’ and ‘local’, 
characterising their interactions in dichotomous terms: ‘liberal’ versus 
‘illiberal’, ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’, ‘Western’ versus ‘non-Western’, 
‘state’ versus ‘non-state’, ‘coercion’ versus ‘resistance’, ‘insurgent’ versus 
‘government’, and ‘peace’ versus ‘conflict’. Such binaries are unhelpful30—
they homogenise categories, oversimplify complex contexts and milieus,31 
and essentialise local (and international) groupings.32 By contrast, several 
scholars have highlighted the multiplicity of outcomes that can occur when 
two entities meet and interact. This critique also points to the extent to 
which, given the historical influences of colonialism and globalisation, 
both ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors and institutions are themselves the 
products of earlier processes of hybridisation. Pitting the international 
against the local therefore distorts the multifarious and continuous 
processes of interaction that characterise all human and societal exchange. 
Pieterse, cognisant of the role of globalisation, comments that hybridity 
indicates profound changes brought about by mobility, migration and 
multiculturalism.33 In other words, hybridity reminds us that categories 
are the site of contestation and negotiation, yet also stresses the fluidity 
within and between categories. Anthropologists have long argued that local 
practices are never static; they are constantly evolving,34 particularly when 
encountering the forces of intervention and globalisation. Petersen argues 
that it is the shift away from these binaries and absolutes that appears 
as the primary appeal of hybridity.35 While nuanced analyses seek to do 
28  Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 330.
29  Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity’; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’; 
Newman, ‘A Human Security Peace-building Agenda’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’.
30  de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking 
of Hybridity’; Heathershaw, ‘Conclusions: Neither Built Nor Formed’.
31  Moreiras, ‘Hybridity and Double Consciousness’; Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’.
32  Peterson, ‘“Rule of Law” Initiatives’; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’.
33  Pieterse, ‘Hybridity, So What?’, 221.
34  Brown, ‘Security, Development and the Nation-building Agenda’, 155.
35  Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’, 12.
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justice to these complexities, contemporary usage of the term ‘hybridity’—
accentuated by the limitations of our available vocabulary—often serves 
inadvertently to reinscribe binaries even as it seeks to unpack them.
A second criticism relates to the frameworks used to discuss hybridity. 
Millar suggests that the literature on hybridity can be characterised as 
either ‘prescriptive’ or ‘descriptive’.36 Descriptive accounts explain what 
hybridity is (and isn’t) and how it comes about. This usage of hybridity 
offers a mechanism for viewing the outcomes of interchange between 
external actors and complex local contexts, as well as for understanding 
the critical role of local agency in mediating external interventions. 
Prescriptive accounts, on the other hand, examine how hybridity can be 
purposefully designed into statebuilding, peacebuilding and governance 
projects.37 Many have warned that prescriptive accounts give licence 
to external intervention, including ambitious and intrusive projects of 
social engineering.38 More importantly, perhaps, critical scholars have 
expressed doubt as to whether hybridity can be harnessed to implement 
stated objectives and goals; some go so far as to suggest interveners 
should not even attempt to harness hybridity.39 Millar is also critical of 
prescriptive approaches, arguing that ‘prescriptive hybridity assumes that 
administering hybrid institutions will foster predictable peace-promoting 
experiences’.40 Others stress the importance of prescriptive hybridity, 
arguing, for example, that customary norms, values and institutions need 
to be incorporated into new structures designed to promote peace, stability 
and development if the goals of creating capable, effective and legitimate 
states are to be realised.41 They argue that while it is a necessary starting 
point, a merely descriptive use of hybridity—describing how things are—
fails to address more fundamental questions about the power imbalances 
and inequality underlying particular hybrid configurations and how these 
might be overcome.42 Politically, a hybrid approach considers hybridity as 
a space where local and international practices are continuously negotiated 
in interactions of differential power; hence, when merely observing the 
pluralistic outcomes of these interactions, the underlying differentials 
in power that animate these outcomes are often glossed over.
36  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 501.
37  Ibid.; Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity’.
38  Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders’.
39  Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices’; see also Hameiri and Jones, this volume.
40  Millar, ‘Disaggregating Hybridity’, 502.
41  Clements et al., ‘State Building Reconsidered’, 48.
42  Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture.
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What these critiques highlight is that the use of hybridity in both 
descriptive  and prescriptive accounts can serve to mask underlying 
injustices and power differentials between international and local actors, 
as well as within each of these spheres. A purely institutionalist approach 
that privileges the processes and outcomes of institutional interaction can 
thus render them devoid of their inherently political character. For example, 
a pure focus on the hybrid features of a hybrid court can detract attention 
from the constrained political circumstances in which these courts are 
established or from questions about whose interests these models serve in 
practice. There are also concerns that attempts to instrumentalise ‘hybrid 
governance’ can be appropriated as part of broader neoliberal agendas 
and used to hollow out already ‘weak’ states by outsourcing the provision 
of public goods to international actors, private providers or, indeed, 
to poor communities themselves.43 Likewise, there are well-founded 
concerns about ‘romanticising the local’ and downplaying significant 
power differentials at the local level based on gender, age, ethnic or other 
significant divisions. All of this suggests that if the hybridity concept is 
used without sufficient attention to the power dynamics and conflictual 
elements in the specific context in question, it can ultimately serve to 
reproduce existing patterns of hierarchy, domination and prevailing 
relations of power.
History, power and scale
Against the background of the growing prominence of the hybridity 
concept and the emerging critiques, it seemed to us as a group of scholars 
engaged in these issues that questions of history, power and scale had 
not been adequately examined. The seminar series, which along with 
the workshop provided an important part of the genesis of this edited 
collection, set out to probe these questions in greater detail. For example, 
we asked presenters to consider whether hybridity describes a relatively 
new undertaking, or whether it merely crystallises processes of interaction 
and syncretism that have deep historical roots. We similarly challenged 
them to reflect on whether focusing on hybridity as a potential ‘solution’ 
to enduring problems of conflict and instability obscures important 
questions of power and agency that are inherent in contested sites of 
institutional transformation, thereby risking potentially unintended and 
43  Meagher, ‘The Strength of Weak States?’.
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undesirable outcomes. Finally, we asked presenters to analyse the role of 
scale in relation to hybridity, including whether and how interactions play 
out differently at local, national, regional and international levels.
Participants at the workshop were asked to reflect on the extent to which 
their work resonates with one or more of six central themes that had 
emerged during the seminar series. The first of these was ‘plurality’. Many 
speakers at the seminar series noted the need to broaden the conventional 
state-centric focus of disciplines such as political science, international 
relations, development studies and law in order to recognise a more 
comprehensive spectrum of state and non-state actors, institutions and 
practices. We asked speakers to consider whether this plurality poses 
difficulties in terms of disentangling different scales of intervention 
spanning ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ levels. How might analyses 
of hybridity work to decentre the conventional focus on the state? How 
might they adequately recognise the complex of linkages, relationships, 
frictions and shifting scales between international and local institutions, 
actors and discourses in particular contexts? Might these relationships and 
frictions also contain emancipatory or generative potential?
The second key theme that emerged during the seminar series was that 
of ‘history’. The role of history, including colonialism, was identified 
repeatedly as playing a fundamental role in the determination of present-
day relationships between institutions in postcolonial societies and, 
indeed, in many cases, their very existence. Much analysis of hybridity 
in disciplines outside history, however, tends to be ‘history blind’. Policy 
discourse, in particular, is often narrowly focused on current circumstances 
and priorities with scant attention to historical precedent. The problematic 
historical uses of hybridity in the discipline of anthropology and its 
unhelpful connotations of essentialism was also raised. Might a more 
historically grounded approach problematise and enrich the concept 
of hybridity?
The third key theme was ‘power’. The prevalence, but also the potential 
invisibility, of power dynamics within and between a wide range of groups 
emerged as a key theme in the seminar series. Some speakers noted that 
the concept of hybridity can mask underlying injustices and power 
differentials between international and local actors, as well as within each 
of these spheres. In this regard, there was an echoing of the concerns raised 
in the emergent critique of hybridity including a tendency to romanticise 
the ‘local’ and neglect local power differences. Other speakers noted that 
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international and national actors and institutions disproportionately 
shape the terms of hybrid arrangements because of structural imbalances 
in the distribution of power and control of resources. Might it be possible 
for analyses of hybridity to pay more attention to conflictual elements and 
power dynamics? While other orders exist, should the particular power 
and resources of the state be analysed differently?
The fourth theme was that of ‘scale’, drawing, in particular, on the 
insights of human geographers, and was one that resonated with many 
speakers from different disciplines. Consistent with the ‘local turn’ in 
peacebuilding scholarship, much of the hybridity literature has an explicit 
orientation towards the most local level in contexts of intervention. 
Given continuing assumptions about the centrality of the nation-state 
as the normal way of organising social and political life, this growing 
sensibility to the significance of subnational scales provides a welcome 
corrective. We nevertheless need to avoid being constrained by artificial 
categorisations of space and scale that obscure the realities of the flow of 
ideas, people, resources and politics across all such categories including 
‘the local’. While assumptions about the centrality of states remain deeply 
entrenched in disciplines like international relations, political science, law 
and development studies, the lived realities of contemporary globalisation 
are much less static and spatially fragmented owing to the dynamic flows 
across what many continue to view as bounded spaces. Analysing these 
fluid and multilayered complexities requires a new spatial imaginary freed 
from such artificial boundaries.
The fifth theme was that of ‘reinscribing binaries’. Another point 
raised during the seminar series was the fact that the hybridity concept 
often reinscribes problematic binaries even as it seeks to unpack them 
(for instance between the global/local). Given the historical influences of 
colonialism, globalisation and intervention, it is often argued that actors 
and institutions are continuously negotiating and renegotiating a range 
of locally derived and non-localised norms and in this sense are already 
‘hybrid’. Does this suggest the need for a different term? Do terms such as 
pluralism, syncretism, the third space, intersections or friction offer more 
theoretically adequate alternatives to the hybridity concept?
The sixth and final theme was ‘conceptual tools’. During the seminar series, 
many speakers identified that ambiguities exist in relation to the ways 
in which the hybridity concept is ‘operationalised’ through policies in 
areas including rule of law and statebuilding and peacebuilding. In some 
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
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ways, the most superficial of these insights has been exploited by those 
driving reforms as a way of co-opting more resources and undermining 
potential opposition. However, the more profound insights about the 
need to engage more equitably with systems, institutions and individuals 
operating on the basis of fundamentally different principles, values and 
world views has been overlooked. We asked speakers to consider what 
conceptual tools might enable the translation of the hybridity concept 
into more meaningful and equitable policy development.
The chapters
Reflecting themes raised in the chapters, we have divided this book into 
four sections. The first, ‘Theorising Hybridity’, contains six chapters 
which interrogate the conceptual foundations of hybridity. Anne Brown’s 
chapter sets the theoretical scene for the book, as she traces the ‘family 
trees’ of the concept of hybridity, ranging from biology to postcolonial 
studies. While Brown notes that neither the concept nor phenomenon of 
hybridity is new, she describes how it emerged in the context of specific 
debates about statebuilding and peacebuilding to bring fresh attention to 
the ‘dense layering of interactions, relations and institutions that make 
up political community and constitute the basis of state formation’. 
She analyses how hybridity has been used in three primary ways in the 
statebuilding and peacebuilding literature: descriptively, aspirationally 
and instrumentally. Brown concludes by proposing more dialogical ways 
of seeking to understand peacebuilding that are grounded in ‘processes 
and habits of open-ended exchange’.
Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht’s chapter interrogates the concept of 
hybridity by focusing on the ‘power of local actors to resist the imposition 
of liberal statebuilding processes’. They are particularly interested in 
including ‘the political’ into analyses of hybridity, in order to recognise 
how hybridity during statebuilding and peacebuilding can be ‘moderated 
by the political power of local elites’. They are also concerned that much 
of the hybridity literature ‘reifies and idealises “the local”’, thereby 
overlooking the power structures and political processes of inclusion and 
exclusion that they involve.
Charles Hunt’s chapter analyses the concept of hybridity from the 
perspective of a relational approach that recognises the multilayered 
nature of sociopolitical orders in conflict-affected societies. Using a case 
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study of Liberia, Hunt illustrates the complexity of these societies and 
the importance of analysing the relationships between different providers 
of order, security and justice. He concludes by arguing for a relational 
approach to hybridity based on a ‘performative-based, liminal and 
integrative understanding of hybrid sociopolitical order’.
Miranda Forsyth’s chapter considers whether the concept of hybridity 
should be used normatively as well as descriptively. She proposes that 
hybridity should be developed to ‘answer questions about how legal/
regulatory systems ought to be, as well as describing how they currently 
work’. Forsyth then makes proposals concerning how this might occur, 
identifying three starting points: ‘focus on the values and objectives at 
stake, concentrate on the processes of change, and analyse the relationships 
between and within different legal orders’. She concludes that developing 
the concept along normative lines can ‘facilitate change agents in helping 
to steer hybrid legal orders in positive and emancipatory directions’.
Joanne Wallis’s chapter traces how a sense of humility within 
Western governments and international institutions regarding liberal 
peacebuilding has facilitated the emergence of the concept of hybridity 
in statebuilding and  peacebuilding in order to achieve ‘good enough’ 
outcomes. She considers how hybridity has operated during peacebuilding 
in Timor-Leste and identifies a number of challenges it has faced. She 
concludes by arguing there is evidence that many Timorese desire a role 
for modern liberal state institutions ‘as a response to the inequality, 
exclusions and injustices that can occur under local practices and 
institutions’, and consequently that while the concept of hybridity should 
not be abandoned, building liberal state institutions may retain a place in 
contemporary peacebuilding.
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones’s chapter takes a more radical stance, 
arguing  that the concept of hybridity is ‘unfit for purpose and must 
be entirely jettisoned’ in the study of statebuilding and peacebuilding. 
They  argue that the hybridity literature has been ‘unable to escape 
binaries based on dichotomised categories of the illiberal-local and 
liberal-international’, which they conclude ‘distorts empirical analysis’. 
Instead, they propose an alternative framework based on a Gramscian 
understanding of the state and other governance institutions as 
‘condensations of social power relations’. They argue that this approach 
helps to recognise the ‘politics of scale’ of ‘hierarchised social, political 
HyBRIDITy ON THE GROUND IN PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT
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and economic territorial spaces’, including how power and resources are 
distributed among different scales during statebuilding and peacebuilding 
interventions.
Section two of the book consists of five chapters that engage with the 
concept of hybridity in the postconflict settings of Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste and Mozambique respectively, with reference to 
broader processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding in these different 
contexts. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Bougainville, Volker 
Boege’s chapter proposes a relational understanding of hybridisation in 
peacebuilding as a fluid and dynamic process of interaction between ‘local’ 
and ‘international’ actors. His chapter documents the extent to which 
Bougainvillean agency was able to mediate and shape the implementation 
and outcomes of the international peacebuilding agenda. This includes 
the ways in which ‘local’ agency was able to appropriate the resources of 
the latter according to Bougainvillean’s priorities, logic and understanding 
of the islands’ unique political economy. Boege also reflects on the 
impacts of these interactions on the international actors and how these 
contributed to the ‘turn to the local’ in regional peacebuilding practice 
and the emergence of a more reflective discourse around ‘relational 
sensibility’.
Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen use a case study of rural Solomon 
Islands to reflect critically on the value of ‘hybridity’ as a concept for 
understanding and engaging with the complex and ongoing processes of 
state formation—as distinct from statebuilding—underway in this island 
nation. While seeing value in engaging with ‘local’ forms of authority 
and regulation in localities where state presence is weak, Dinnen and 
Allen share many of the concerns raised by critics of ‘the local turn’ in 
peacebuilding and development. They also point out that attempts to 
instrumentalise hybridity are by no means confined to international and 
national-level actors but are also apparent in the strategies of local-level 
actors. Their chapter emphasises the multiple scales at which processes 
of hybridisation take place, with an explicit critique of the privileging 
of ‘the local’ scale in much of the hybridity literature. The authors also 
question assumptions that local-level actors naturally prefer local forms 
of authority and organisation over state and transnational forms. On the 
contrary, they argue that many rural Solomon Islanders are demanding 
greater engagement with Weberian-like institutions that are perceived—
rightly or wrongly—as being more emancipated from what are viewed as 
the corrosive and corrupting influence of local social and power relations.
13
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Drawing on her research into transitional justice in Timor-Leste, 
Lia Kent’s starting point is the need to pay more attention to the ways in 
which individuals and communities deal with the legacies of the violent 
past outside formal institutional contexts and dispute resolution forums. 
She argues that these subtler actions and practices are critical to ongoing 
processes of reconstructing social life in postconflict Timor-Leste and 
are better understood as part of a process of ‘everyday’ reconciliation 
where those with limited power ‘make do’ with resources, tactics and 
possibilities. In doing so, she seeks to widen the scope of what has hitherto 
been encompassed in analyses of hybrid transitional justice by proposing 
a richer conception that goes beyond a focus on institutions, structures 
and conflict resolution ‘events’ and pays more attention to the ongoing 
process of rebuilding everyday life and renegotiating relationships 
following conflict. Central to Kent’s conception of hybrid transitional 
justice is a relational understanding of individuals as ‘socially constituted’ 
and ‘attached to others’. As she argues, this more dynamic understanding 
is particularly relevant in kinship-based societies such as Timor-Leste, 
where maintaining good relations is not only important to an individual’s 
social standing, but is absolutely critical to sustaining viable social life, 
security and economic survival.
Victor Igreja’s chapter examines what he terms ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ 
and ‘embodied accountability’ in postwar Mozambique, where he has 
undertaken periodic fieldwork over the past two decades. Following the 
country’s protracted and bloody civil war (1976–1992), state authorities 
took no steps to hold the perpetrators of serious acts of violence accountable 
for their actions. Igreja’s focus on ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ examines the 
participation of war survivors, community leaders and spiritual agents 
in struggles for accountability and justice in particular rural localities. 
Sometimes this involves negotiations with individual representatives 
of state authority, such as police officers. At other times, this kind of 
bargaining entails ignoring or manipulating state agents and each other 
in order to pursue personal and more culturally meaningful forms of 
accountability and justice. State authorities similarly shift between taking 
diverse community actors seriously to ignoring and manipulating them, 
and, on occasion, violently abusing them. For Igreja, the continuously 
shifting and unpredictable quality of ‘post-hybridity bargaining’ serves 
to unsettle notions of hybridity that assume a relatively stable state of 
co-existence and overlap between different political orders. Any attempt 
to formalise or render more predictable the outcomes of such fluid and 
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malleable processes of negotiation is fraught with risk, not least given that 
these very qualities are key sources of social innovation and change. In his 
view, policy engagements in this area must themselves be experimental 
in order to have any chance of success.
The last chapter in this section, by James Scambary and Todd Wassel, 
returns the reader to Timor-Leste and the challenges of national and 
international peacebuilding efforts, particularly following serious 
disturbances in Dili in 2006, in such a dynamic social landscape. It draws 
on the practical fieldwork experiences of both authors in Timor-Leste over 
the past ten years. Echoing key strands in the emergent critique of hybrid 
peacebuilding, Scambary and Wassel highlight the limited understanding 
of Timor-Leste’s complex, nonlinear and rapidly changing social systems, 
as well as the highly localised scale and endemic nature of conflict in 
this country. Using a case study approach to trace the evolution of 
peacebuilding efforts since 2006, the authors strike an optimistic note in 
illustrating how recent initiatives have been based on nuanced analyses 
of local forms of authority and organisation and, indeed, different forms 
of hybridity. These efforts have met with some success in reinvigorating 
community networks going beyond preconceived ideas about ‘traditional 
leadership’ and are open to engaging with a variety of other actors including 
clandestine associations, youth groups and church organisations.
The third section consists of two chapters that examine hybridity in 
relation to broader issues of security and politics. Drawing on the canons 
of (Western) war studies, as well as contemporary strategic and security 
studies, Gavin Mount’s chapter adopts a ‘hybrid sensibility’ to explore the 
blurred boundaries between war and peace. His survey of the canonical 
texts shows how a reflexive analysis of dominant binary categories of 
‘war’ and ‘peace’ can be used to elucidate the hybrid dynamics of power, 
legitimacy and identity in conflict-affected societies. A focus on the 
interstitial period between states of war and relative peace demonstrates that 
these conditions exist on a continuum and that both categories are firmly 
anchored in shared notions of the ‘political’. For Mount, the conceptual 
or heuristic value of hybridity in thinking about war and peace relates to 
how it allows analysts to reinscribe rigid boundaries while simultaneously 
revealing significant nuances and overlapping understandings.
Imelda Deinla’s chapter draws on research undertaken by herself and 
colleagues in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, an area of 
the southern Philippines that is well known for its ethnic and religious 
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divisions and longstanding pattern of conflict. Hybrid justice mechanisms 
have developed in this region as ways of coping with insecurity arising 
from actual and perceived injustices. These mechanisms are drawn 
from a plurality of customary, Islamic and state justice practices and 
work through informal networks. They appear to do so in a relatively 
coordinated way and serve to prevent conflict escalation while providing 
a level of justice and security provision to local populations. As well as 
being locally initiated, innovations are now also evident in respect of some 
national initiatives responding to local demands for more timely, flexible 
and adequate dispute resolution. These forms of hybrid justice emanating 
from national or state-level sources offer insights into how professional 
and culturally attuned justice provision can provide a better alternative 
to locally initiated mechanisms that remain susceptible to capture by 
local elites and discriminatory practices against vulnerable groups such 
as women.
The chapters in the fourth and final section examine hybridity in 
relation to gender. In different ways, each chapter draws attention 
to how hybridised environments can offer both opportunities and 
constraints to women, and highlights the need for analyses of hybridity 
to pay more attention to gendered power relations. The first chapter, by 
Damian Grenfell, draws on long-term fieldwork to examine the thorny 
issue of violence against women in Timor-Leste. Taking as his starting 
point the idea that ‘customary’ and ‘modern’ forms of spatiality co-exist 
in Timor-Leste, Grenfell suggests that while modern space tends to be 
treated as ‘secular, empty, commodifiable, transferrable’, customary 
space is understood very differently, and is characterised by genealogical 
and kinship connections between living people and, in turn, their 
relationship with the ancestors. Critical of the ways in which international 
development agencies ‘render’ Timor-Leste as patriarchal—a move that 
labels the population negatively and deems it in need of ‘modernising’—
Grenfell argues that modern forms of spatiality may be just as gendered as 
customary forms of spatiality. To illustrate his argument, Grenfell shows 
that in Timor-Leste’s capital, Dili, modern modes of production work 
to ‘contain’ women to the private sphere in ways that often exacerbate 
their dependence on intimate partners. He concludes by arguing that the 
interaction and overlap between customary and modern spatialities may 
at times compound women’s experiences of violence rather than enabling 
pathways away from it.
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The next chapter by Nicole George is a study of Fiji, specifically of the 
gendered consequences of the hybridised security environment. George 
focuses on the ways in which the operations of ‘state security agencies 
in Fiji are shaped by, and intertwined with, powerful institutions of 
customary and religious authority’. While at first glance the fusing of state 
and indigenous authority structures might suggest that state policing is 
more locally resonant, George argues that the interplay between ‘bottom-
up’ and ‘top-down’ sites of authority generates its own gendered exclusions 
and restrictions. George deploys Nils Bubant’s concept of ‘vernacular 
security’ to explore how threats to security are framed and legitimised. 
Specifically, she shows how the Methodist faith and custom both ‘sustain 
a sense of distinctive Fijian unity and identity’ and simultaneously give 
rise to ‘fears about Fijians’ ultimate survival and need for vigorous state 
protection of indigenous custom and the centrality of their church’. 
In  this context, women’s identity and behaviour are rigorously policed 
to ensure that gendered norms, which are viewed as foundational to 
the achievement and maintenance of social order, predominate. George 
concludes with a call for more nuanced thinking about the ‘vernacularised 
ontologies of uncertainty and insecurity that are generated in hybridised 
environments’ which, in the Fijian context at least, have resulted in forms 
of policing that are deeply gendered.
The final chapter, by Ceridwen Spark, on Papua New Guinea, offers 
a more optimistic perspective on the potential of hybrid spaces to open 
up possibilities for women. Spark explores the French-owned Duffy 
cafe in Port Moresby, which is frequented by expatriates and well-to-do 
Papuan New Guineans, as a site of hybridity. Spark argues that it would 
be erroneous to see the cafe merely as the embodiment of wealth, privilege 
and consumerism, suggesting that to some extent it has also become 
a site where ‘new sociospatial practices and identities’ are produced that 
challenge the dominant constructions of class and gender in Port Moresby. 
Spark illustrates these dynamics by drawing on photos and commentary 
shared by a Papuan New Guinean woman, ‘Karuka’, who now lives in 
Melbourne, Australia. Through the eyes of Karuka and other women 
interviewed by Spark, we are able to see that Duffy enables some ‘women 
to construct themselves as friends and customers—rather than daughters, 
wives or sisters—and in doing so provides momentary liberation from the 




As the hybridity concept becomes ever more popular among academics 
and policymakers working in the interrelated fields of development, 
security studies and peacebuilding, nuanced reflections on its utility are 
increasingly necessary. A notable strength of the contributions to this 
edited collection is that they are grounded in in-depth knowledge of 
specific local contexts. This enriches the analyses, and allows the messy, 
awkward and dynamic realities of hybridity—the power dynamic, and 
diverse actors, ideas, practices and sites that shape it—to be brought 
into full view. This, in turn, provides rich insights into the possibilities 
and limitations of hybridity as a conceptual tool.
This text is taken from Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and 
Development: Critical Conversations, edited by Joanne Wallis, Lia Kent, 
Miranda Forsyth, Sinclair Dinnen and Srinjoy Bose, published 2018 by 
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